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I. INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction in 1998, the golden rule has played a key role underpinning the U.K. fiscal framework. The golden rule stipulates that over the economic cycle, the government should borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending. More specifically, it requires the current budget to be in balance or surplus on average over the economic cycle. The rationale for focusing on the current budget is to protect investment spending, which is particularly important in the United Kingdom given significant infrastructure needs. The rationale for targeting "over the cycle" is to allow automatic stabilizers to work without jeopardizing long-term fiscal sustainability. The present formulation of the rule allows fiscal performance to be tested ex-post as to whether the golden rule has been met. By identifying the cycles and in turn the cyclical effects on the public finances, it also aims to assess the underlying structural fiscal position.
While the golden rule is widely seen as having constrained discretion, the "over the cycle" formulation of the rule gives rise to two drawbacks. First, the automatic stabilizers may not be allowed to operate fully because procyclical fiscal tightening may be required toward the end of a cycle to ensure that the golden rule is met. Second, the ex-post test of fiscal performance requires precise dating of the economic cycle, which leads to controversy since alternative methodologies can yield significantly different interpretations of the cycle.
Against this background, the objective of this paper is to investigate an alternative modus operandi for the golden rule that would address both of these drawbacks. Specifically, the paper examines the merits of making the fiscal rule exclusively forward-looking and independent of the dating of the cycle by aiming for current balance or better over a rolling time horizon. For this purpose, the paper will compare fiscal performance under different ways of implementing the golden rule using a simple open economy model of the U.K. economy, which is subject to various stochastic shocks. In analyzing the results, the paper focuses on the following three issues:
• How does the uncertainty associated with precise dating of the cycles affect the implementation of fiscal policy? The paper will illustrate the considerable difficulties in planning and implementing fiscal policy over the cycle even when the cycles are perfectly observable ex-post.
• How big is the risk of procyclicality in fiscal policy implementation? The paper will show that the alternative formulation of the golden rule reduces the volatility of output and prices by removing the cycle from the operational target of the golden rule. In turn, this will reduce the risk of procyclical fiscal policy. However, this is accompanied by a slight increase in the variability in the ratio of debt to GDP over the cycle.
• To what extent are the results robust? The paper compares performance across a range of two-to five-year rolling time horizons to check the robustness of the simulation results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief description of developments leading to the introduction of the golden rule and illustrates the difficulties associated with a strict implementation of the rule in practice. Section III provides a brief overview of the structural macroeconomic model used in the paper to simulate performance of alternative fiscal rules in the presence of various stochastic shocks. More details of the model and the estimation results are presented in the appendices. Section IV summarizes the key simulation results. Section V provides some concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
The significant deterioration in the underlying fiscal position in the late 1980s contributed to the current design of the fiscal framework. U.K. Treasury (1997) explains that the large slippage in the public finances during the period FY1989/90-FY1993/94 was due in part to a misjudgment. 1 The sizeable improvement in the public finances in the second half of the 1980s was thought to reflect mostly structural factors, but the sharp weakening in the budget balance during the subsequent economic downturn suggested that cyclical factors may have played more of a role in this fiscal improvement. In addition, the medium-term orientation of fiscal policy lacked a clear and stable objective that allowed an ex-post evaluation of its performance. To address past problems that contributed to economic instability and a neglect of public investment, the government introduced a new fiscal framework over the economic cycle based on two pillars: (i) fiscal rules to ensure sustainability while allowing short-run flexibility, with the "golden rule," which prohibits current spending from being financed through borrowing over the economic cycle, and a "sustainable investment rule," which requires public sector net debt be kept over the economic cycle at a "stable and prudent" level, currently interpreted as below 40 percent of GDP; and (ii) a multiyear spending framework that sought to increase predictability and avoid a historical bias against capital spending. With a greater role being played by cyclically adjusted indicators in setting the stance of fiscal policy, the golden rule aims at enhancing macroeconomic stability by allowing the automatic stabilizers to operate in response to cyclical variations. An objective ex-post evaluation of fiscal performance at the same time was expected to add accountability and credibility to fiscal policy.
However, an ex-post assessment of observance of the golden rule requires precise dating of the economic cycle, which in practice involves a considerable degree of imprecision. First, there are different views about how to define cycles.
2 A traditional approach is based on identifying the turning points in the level of output. Alternatively, cycles can be identified by decomposing the level of output between trend and cyclical factors, which is closely associated with measuring the output gap. Second, there is a wide range of alternative approaches to estimating the cycles. These include statistical filtering such as the HodrickPrescott (HP) filter, the production function approach, the turning point approach following the principles laid out by NBER practices, and the U.K. Treasury's on-trend-point approach. Different methodologies can yield significantly different estimates of the dating of the cycles; hence, judgment plays an important role.
Although judgment is necessary, there may be a perception of conflict of interest in the way the cycle is currently defined. The dating of the economic cycle is critical to measuring fiscal performance against the golden rule. At present, the Treasury not only determines the economic cycle but also conducts the self assessment as to whether the fiscal rules have been met or not over a cycle. In 2005, following important revisions in the national account data, the Treasury redefined the economic cycle by moving back the start of the cycle from 1999 to 1997. While this redating was seen as technically defensible-as confirmed by the audit conducted by the National Audit Office (NAO)-it raised questions about the possible manipulation of the rules as the new dates pulled a sizable current surplus in 1998 into the present cycle, effectively providing room to delay adjustment without imperiling observance of the golden rule. 
III. THE MODEL AND THE SIMULATION
The paper simulates the performance of an alternative way to implement the golden rule when the economy is subject to various dynamic stochastic shocks. For this purpose, a small open-economy "New Keynesian" model with rational expectations is used. The model is specified in gap and rate-of-change terms so that, under inflation targeting, all variables are stationary. For simulation purposes, the equilibrium values for the real interest rate, and the real exchange rate are assumed to be time invariant. The U.K. portion of the model consists of five key behavioral equations given by the following:
(1)
Aggregate demand (IS function) 
where ygap is the output gap, rr is the real interest rate, z is the real exchange rate, FB is the fiscal balance, π is CPI inflation, rs is the nominal policy rate, D is the government debt, and Dgap is the deviation from the government's debt target D*. For this exercise, debt is defined as the cumulative fiscal balance. In addition, Δ is the first difference operator, * denotes foreign variables, ε denotes error terms, and parameters are given by the β s , δ s , φ, and α s . The foreign sector is characterized by the similar behavioral equations, but there is no endogenous fiscal policy reaction function in the foreign sector.
The fiscal rule is designed to simultaneously ensure a consistently countercyclical fiscal stance and achieve a stable public debt target. As indicated in equation (5) above, the fiscal policy reaction function sets the path for the fiscal balance (in percent of GDP) as a function of the output gap (to allow the automatic stabilizers to function) and a discretionary policy term, which aims at achieving a specific policy objective. By construction, the automatic stabilizers take effect regardless of the modus operandi of the fiscal rule, however, their effects can be either offset or complemented by the size and the direction of discretionary policy. The rest of the world (ROW) portion of the model consists of equations for aggregate demand, inflation, and the monetary policy reaction function.
The model is estimated using the Bayesian technique for a sample period of 1992:Q4-2006:Q4. The simple model abstracts from many important features of the economy, especially the supply side, and it does not solve endogenously for the equilibrium values for the real exchange rate or potential output growth. Nevertheless, the model incorporates the key channels of monetary policy transmission and, with the introduction of fiscal policy, it captures the effects of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. Additional details of the model and the estimation results are presented in Appendix I.
Using the estimated parameters, the model can be simulated under stochastic shocks that fit the historical U.K. data. The economy is hit by seven different stochastic shocks in every period, representing shocks to output, prices and interest rates in the U.K. and the ROW portion of the model, and to the real exchange rate. These shocks are drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and the standard deviation equivalent to the estimated value in the model. The simulation starts from the steady-state solution of the model. To evaluate performance of alternative specifications of the fiscal rule, simulations are conducted over 1000 draws that last for 100 quarters. 5 Each draw can be considered as containing a sequence of 100 model-based forecasts.
The simulation for each period is conducted in three steps (see flow chart below). The first step involves updating the model-based macroeconomic forecasts consistent with achieving the inflation target in response to new stochastic shocks at date t, given the state of the Step 1 Model forecasts Monetary policy rule decision Automatic stabilizers (t)
Step 2 Economic cycles
Step economy at the previous date t-1 (and the latest discretionary fiscal policy decisions available by the fiscal authorities). In setting a path for the policy interest rate, the monetary authorities take into account the effects of the automatic fiscal stabilizers in response to changes in the output gap. The second step involves identifying the economic cycles-for both ongoing and future cycles. Because of the new shocks, the amplitude and the ending date of the current cycle may have shifted. To make the simulation more illustrative, the paper assumes that expost the output gaps are fully observable and perfectly measurable. Given the economic cycles, the third step involves adjusting the current and future path for the fiscal balance with the objective of meeting the fiscal rule being tested. Because the automatic stabilizers are already in place, any fiscal adjustment requires changes in the discretionary component of fiscal policy. Finally, the current period's outcome, forecast, and any adjustment to fiscal policy become available to the policymaker in the subsequent period and the three-step simulation starts again. While the frequency with which monetary authorities revise policy settings based on new inflation forecasts is high, fiscal policy tends to be revised only on an annual basis. 6 Taking this into account in the simulations, the discretionary component of fiscal policy is updated only once a year. Until the next fiscal forecast becomes available, the monetary policy decision continues to base on the latest available information from the fiscal authorities.
A. The Economic Cycle-Definition and Identification
The U.K. Treasury defines cycles by identifying on-trend points in the cycle. As described above, the use of the level of the output gap to define cycles is different from the standard methodology that uses the level of output to detect turning points. However, this paper follows a similar approach to the Treasury's by identifying the crossing points between trend and actual output, specifically where there is no output gap in the economy. By definition, in each cycle, the output gap crosses the zero line three times. In line with the Treasury's approach, to select only those "decisive" crossing points and exclude those temporary movements around the zero output gap, the paper requires four consecutive quarters of either a positive or negative output gap following a change in its sign in order to define crossing points.
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Applying this definition to estimates of the U.K. output gap, three cycles can be identified during the period since the late 1970s, 1978:Q1 to 1987:Q2, 1987:Q3 to 1997:Q3, and 1997:Q4 to 2003:Q2. 8 The chart below (left) suggests that the cycles have become shorter and their amplitude shallower over time. In the simulations conducted over 1,000 draws that last for 100 quarters (25 years), the average length of each cycle is about 27 quarters. The result is very similar to other findings in the literature. 
B. Fiscal Balances
Fiscal balances are determined by two components, the automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy. The automatic stabilizers ( t Ast ) are computed using the same elasticities with respect to contemporaneous and lagged output gaps estimated by the Treasury in 2003. 10 The discretionary component aims at achieving a specific policy objective, given the effects of the automatic stabilizers, to meet the fiscal rule. Because there are no differences in the effects of the automatic stabilizers, any differences in fiscal policy stems from the discretionary component. In the model the fiscal balance is specified in gap terms, defined as the deviation from the equilibrium fiscal balance. In the context of the United Kingdom, the equilibrium overall fiscal balance is calibrated at -2 percent of GDP, which is consistent with maintaining a zero current balance and 2 percent of GDP in net investment so as to satisfy long-term investment needs. At the same time, this is consistent with stabilizing public sector net debt at 40 percent of GDP. Finally, debt is defined as the cumulative sum of the fiscal balance gaps (CumFB).
11 Similarly to other variables, the starting value of the fiscal balance (gap) is zero.
The fiscal balance under the current "over the cycle" formulation of the golden rule is specified as follows: E CumFB − Δ . The paper assumes that any adjustment required to achieve balance or surplus in the current budget over the economic cycle is introduced smoothly and gradually over the remainder of the cycle. To introduce a non-negativity constraint in the cumulative balance as required in the golden rule, the fiscal authorities are assumed to introduce measures necessary to achieve balance in the end if they face a cumulative deficit. However, the fiscal balance is not allowed to deteriorate sharply at the end of the cycle because of "overspending" at the last moment to offset a cumulative surplus.
Alternatively, the operational target of the golden rule is changed from current balance or better "over the cycle" to aiming for current balance or better "over a forward-looking rolling horizon." Specifically, the paper examines the range between two-and five-year rolling horizons. In evaluating fiscal performance of such forward-looking rule, the paper will focus on the three-year horizon. However, as explained in more detail below, simulation results are robust to different time horizons. The alternative modus operandi-called here the "forwardlooking rule"-is defined as the following: 
11 Note that a positive (negative) gap in the fiscal balance implies a surplus (deficit). Thus, increase (decline) in CumFB in this model is equivalent to a decline (increase) in debt. 1.0 FBgap = − ), one-twelfth of the needed fiscal adjustment is introduced each successive quarter. To allow for the non-negativity constraint, if the expected fiscal balance three years ahead is in surplus, fiscal policy is projected to let just the automatic stabilizers operate for at least four quarters until the fiscal projections are revised given new developments.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The model results suggest that the uncertainty associated with balancing over the cycle is significantly large even when cycles are perfectly observable ex-post. A cycle that is initially forecast to begin with a strong period of upswing can change its course to a downturn following adverse shocks to the economy. During a cycle, as different shocks hit the economy, the projected end of the cycle may shift unexpectedly and continuously. In addition, depending on the relative size and the composition of the shocks, downswings and upswings can differ in terms of their intensity or duration, with important implications for the public finances. As a result, an attempt to meet a particular fiscal objective "over the cycle" may result in unnecessary fluctuations in fiscal policy and hence in the real economy.
The uncertainty about the end of the cycle has significant implications for achieving current balance in the present formulation of the golden rule. Simulations suggest that, under the "over the cycle" formulation of the golden rule, the 95 percent confidence interval for the cumulative balance at the end of the cycle is in the range of ±1 percent of GDP. This implies that the golden rule would be breached nearly half of the time. More specifically, the resulting distribution of the cumulative balance at the end of the cycle suggests that there is a 45 percent probability that the cumulative balance falls into deficit. This is because sometimes cycles end unexpectedly before any required adjustment can occur. Although the likelihood of missing by a large margin-defined as more than ½ percentage point of GDP-is relatively low, at about 15 percent. The high frequency of missing could damage the credibility of the fiscal rule. Thus, in the "over-the-cycle" formulation, there is an important risk that fiscal policy becomes increasingly procyclical toward the end of the cycle. Cyclical consideration of the golden rule calls for accumulating margins (cumulative surpluses) during the good times so as to compensate for deficits during the bad times. However, if the projected end of the cycle is suddenly nearer, or if the downswings are longer or more intense than expected, achieving current balance or better over the cycle may require considerable fiscal adjustment over a short period toward the end of the cycle. Large fiscal consolidation when there is slack in the economy could deepen the downturn. Simulation results suggest that in trying to achieve balance or better in the current balance over the cycle, the risk of such procyclicality increases progressively as the cycle approaches the end (see table below). While there is virtually no procyclical fiscal policy during the early stage of the cycle, in the final stage, fiscal policy becomes procyclical at some point by more than ½ percentage points of GDP in over half of the 2,767 simulated cycles. 12 In particular, in about 12 percent of the simulated cycles, fiscal policy was procyclical during the entire last fourth of each cycle. In contrast, under the alternative forward-looking three-year rule, such risk is virtually zero. This is because early overperformance cannot be used to offset later underperformance. By reducing the risk of procyclical fiscal policy, the volatility of output and prices can be reduced. A comparison of the standard deviation of output and inflation with and without fiscal policy suggests that fiscal policy plays an important role in lowering the volatility of the economy (see table below). This is primarily attributed to the operation of the automatic stabilizers. Both the balance over the cycle rule and the forward-looking rule add stability to economic activity. However, because of procyclical fiscal policy at times toward the end of a cycle using a balance "over the cycle" formulation, the forward-looking formulation at a three-year horizon enhances economic stability by about 5 to 7 percent.
Implementing the golden rule at a forward-looking rolling horizon gets rid of procyclicality, but imposes a somewhat looser constraint on debt over any given cycle. Assuming the simulation starts with the level of public sector net debt at 40 percent of GDP, a comparison of the standard deviation of the cumulative balance (the debt-to-GDP ratio) over the cycle suggests that under the golden rule as it is currently implemented, 95 percent of the time net debt would remain within ±5 percentage points of the debt ceiling (between 35 and 45 percent of GDP). In contrast, the fluctuation is larger when a three-year ahead rolling horizon is used. Under this alternative, net debt would be within ±7 percentage points of GDP from the debt ceiling 95 percent of the time. Despite slightly larger movement in the debt level, the simulation also suggests that on average over the cycle the level of net debt declines by 0.3 percentage points of GDP under the forward-looking three-year alternative.
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This is because of the asymmetric implementation of this rule. Specifically, fiscal policy is solely governed by the operation of the automatic stabilizers if the economy is projected to be above trend three years ahead and surpluses are not spent.
Higher debt volatility under the forward-looking formulation of the golden rule could be reduced by introducing a debt band around the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio. Fiscal policy continues to aim at achieving a fiscal balance three years ahead, but once the cumulative balance goes outside the band, it is required to take more aggressive measures to ensure that the cumulative balance returns within the band. This can be specified by adding a third term in equation (7) that constrains the fiscal balance depending on the level of the cumulative 13 Note that cumulative debt is defined as the cumulative sum of the fiscal balance, where positive implies a surplus, hence decline in debt. where D1=1 when CumFB D > and D1=0 otherwise, and D2 is the adjustment effort. For simplicity, D2 is set to 1, thereby whenever the cumulative balance goes outside the band, a fiscal measure amounting to 1 percent of GDP is automatically introduced.
Simulation results show that a debt band with a width of ±3 percentage points of GDP lowers debt volatility under the forward-looking formulation to ±5 percentage points, but adds back a small risk of procyclicality (Table 3 ). This is because there are sometimes conflicts in achieving a flow target at a three-year horizon and at the same time meeting the stock target. Nonetheless, the risk of procyclical fiscal policy is considerably smaller than in the "over the cycle" formulation of the golden rule. Simulation results are robust to different time horizons used to specify alternative ways of implementing the golden rule. A comparison of fiscal performance at a two-year ahead or five-year ahead rolling time horizons suggests that the volatility of output and prices remain broadly unchanged from the result under the three-year time horizon. Ex-ante, the projected fiscal balance is different as the two-year ahead rule aims at achieving current balance or better in two years, while the five-year rule would aim for five-year ahead. However, ex-post, the realized fiscal balances are broadly similar with some small differences in the cumulative balance over the cycle. The volatility in the cumulative balance over the cycle remains large, but because the two-year rule starts introducing any required adjustment earlier, on average there is somewhat larger reduction in debt over time. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that making formulation of the golden rule exclusively forward-looking and independent of the dating of the cycle would enhance macroeconomic stability. Using an open economy model of the U.K. economy, it can be demonstrated that changing the modus operandi of the golden rule from current balance or better "over the cycle" to aiming for current balance or better "at a two-five-year ahead rolling horizon" would reduce the volatility of output and prices. This is because with the "over the cycle" formulation, there is a risk that, if the projected end of the cycle is suddenly nearer, a considerable fiscal adjustment over a short period may be required. Simulations suggest that the risk of a procyclical fiscal adjustment (defined as a procyclical fiscal adjustment of at least ½ percentage point of GDP per year during the last quartile of a cycle that adds to domestic demand when GDP is above trend or subtracts from it when GDP is below trend) is about 12 percent. The risk of procyclicality is virtually zero when the golden rule is implemented "at a two-five-year ahead horizon" instead. Using the forward-looking rule increases the variability of the debt-to-GDP ratio slightly from ±5 to ±7 percentage points of GDP, but this could be mitigated by introducing a debt band around the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio.
The analysis conducted in this paper is subject to a number of caveats. The model specification is simple and abstracts from other important issues in assessing fiscal policy. For example, the model does not explicitly take into account movements in asset prices. This may be particularly important for the United Kingdom given the increasing importance of the financial sector in economic activity. Also, while the simulations use estimated parameters and shocks that fit the historical U.K. data, the true parameters may be different going forward.
In addition, the successful implementation of a forward-looking rule still depends on unbiased judgments about the economy's prospects. Unless macroeconomic projections are unbiased, there is a risk that fiscal slippages could accumulate rapidly, increasing the debt burden. Indeed, without an ex-post test of fiscal performance, (however imperfect), the credibility of ex-ante forecasts is arguably even more important. 
